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Since World War II, household direct equity ownership has declined precipitously. In the United
States, just after the war, households directly owned 90% of the stock market; by 2010, this gure
has come down to below 30%. The share ownership largely migrated to nancial institutions that
have ascended as the largest holder of equity. In 2010, domestic nancial institutions owned almost
50% of U.S. stocks.1 This long-term decline is not restricted just to the United States but spans the
globe. None of the developed countries had a direct household ownership above 30% in 2005{2010,
with the average around 17%, and for the countries for which the historic data are available, the
direct ownership numbers fty or sixty years ago show the same steep decline. Such a structural
change bears directly on the issues of corporate governance, asset pricing, eectiveness of taxation,
institutional development, among many others.
Why such a big drop? A natural response of economists is that intermediaries like the mutual
fund industry have taken over stock ownership due to a public demand for portfolio diversication.
In this paper, however, we argue that the major force behind these changes is the two pillars of
government policy: taxation and retirement regulation. Indeed, it is most likely that not only
households gave up direct ownership of stocks due to associated tax benets but the whole rise of
nancial intermediaries as stockholders owes largely to these two pillars. Our ndings shed new
light on the long-term (and likely unintended) eects of taxation on corporate nance and asset
prices, demonstrate substantial path-dependence in agents' feedback to policy changes, and should
be of interest to academic researchers and public policy makers alike.
The particular tax policies that have inuenced stock ownership are those that on the one hand
have increased eective households' income tax, and on the other have created the possibility for
pre-tax savings. Such policies are fairly recent, having originated only in the rst half of the XXth
century in the United States. In a nutshell, when marginal income taxes are high, households prefer
to save within their tax-deferred retirement plans. In addition, when tax tables are inaccurately
adjusted for ination, higher ination increases incentives to move assets to tax-deferred accounts
1This number in fact is a substantial underestimation as it does not take into account foreign investors, most of
whom are likely nancial institutions.
2even further. These incentives have led to the rise of various nancial intermediaries, such as pension
funds in the United States and insurance companies in other countries. Our estimates suggest that
up to 40% of all stocks in the United States|and up to 60% of stocks held by domestic agents such
as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies|are now kept in tax-deferred plans.
The proliferation of the mutual fund industry is one phenomenon that is better explained
by the tax-related forces than by the need to diversify. Some mutual fund empirical researchers
should be surprised to learn that as late as 1980, the mutual fund industry in the United States
owned less than 3% of all stocks and 1% of all bonds. In the United States and other countries,
mutual funds took o only when the dened-benet retirement plans were replaced with dened-
contribution plans which allow people to choose their own providers. U.S. dened-contribution
plans|401(k)s|became active only in 1982. Prior to that, over the 1950s{1970s (and particular
in the 1970s when higher ination increased tax incentives to transfer assets), a dramatic growth
in institutional ownership occurred to private pensions, major beneciaries of the dened-benet
plans. After the introduction of 401(k), mutual funds quickly increased their stock ownership share
at the expense of pension funds. The same phenomenon started taking place in other countries as
retirement contribution plans were instituted. In countries where dened-benet contributions did
not get instated or do not have associated tax benets, mutual funds did not take o until very
recently.2
To appreciate the diculty of the empirical task we face, note that to provide economic under-
pinning for our results, using the time-series from one country is decidedly not sucient. What is
needed is the long-term panel for a reasonably large cross-section of countries where stock owner-
ship and eective tax rates follow a dierent path. For most countries, historical ownership data of
acceptable quality are not available. We have been able to construct long-term time series for eight
countries (United States, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom).
For these countries, for each year we also painstakingly collected and estimated eective personal
income, dividend, and capital gains taxes as well as all necessary retirement provisions. At the end,
2In many European countries, the shift from dened benet to dened contribution schemes has not yet really
started. Of the countries in our sample, Canada, Sweden, and United Kingdom adopted 401(k)-type plans around
1990, and France, Germany, and Japan in the 2000s.
3our panel provides substantial cross-country and time-series heterogeneity to clearly pinpoint the
relationship between government policy and securities ownership. In short, the evolution of stock
ownership from individuals to intermediaries is signicantly related to variations in tax policy. We
nd that for each 1% increase in our proxy for dierence in annual returns between tax-deferred
and fully taxable investment, households reduce their direct stock ownership share by about 30
basis points. For the United States and Canada, we were also able to collect historical data on
bond ownership, and the trend further supports the tax-retirement explanation.
Our ndings have important implications both for academic research and public policy, and can
explain a number of observed stylized facts. In the realm of asset pricing, stock prices would have
been arguably much lower without the dynamic tax clientele shift from households to pension plans.
Sialm (2009) provides supporting evidence of the relation between stock prices and eective tax
rates. Stock ownership structure has important implications for corporate governance. As nancial
intermediaries crystalize as the largest owners of corporate equity, making them act responsibly
in corporate governance matters becomes of paramount importance (see Coee (1991), Friedman
(1996), and Blackburn (2002)). In terms of public policy, personal tax has become increasingly less
relevant for stock trading behavior. It is unlikely, for example, that changes in capital gains taxes
in the Unites States over the past ten years had any signicant impact on stock values, portfolio
decisions, and economic growth. As a substantial fraction of stocks is held in tax-deferred plans,
any temporary changes in tax policy are not likely to aect these variables. As long-term changes
in ownership have led to a substantial loss in tax revenue, they work as a countervailing force to
the original tax reforms aimed at increasing tax revenue.
Overall, our ndings suggest that academic research conducted over the past few decades on the
long-term eects of taxation on corporate nance and asset prices may need to be reevaluated. The
implication that the changes in pension legislation and subsequent tax reforms led to long-term
institutional changes in nancial contracts and have in large part determined the evolution and
proliferation of nancial institutions as we know them today also has profound consequences for
academic and public policy debates.
The paper is related to the burgeoning eld of estimating the eect of taxation on corporate
4nance and asset prices. For the U.S. tax environment before 1986, Ippolito (1986) estimated as
much as 40% reduction in lifetime tax liability from optimally saving inside tax-deferred plans.
Important theoretical contributions to the literature on tax clienteles in the stock and bond mar-
kets include Brennan (1970) (stock market), Miller (1977) (bond market), and Auerbach and King
(1983) (stock and bond market together). The empirical search for tax clientele eects has ex-
amined cross-sections of stock returns (Black and Scholes (1974), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1979)), abnormal stock returns around the ex-dividend day (Elton and Gruber (1970)), direct
stock ownership data (Dahlquist, Robertsson, and Rydqvist (2009)), and household portfolio data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances (Poterba and Samwick (2003)). Tax clientele eects are
hard to detect in cross-sectional data and our paper suggest that the main piece of evidence can be
found in the time-series by detecting the dynamic tax clientele shift, what Ippolito (1986) labels
\the tax theory of pension funds".
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We start by exploring the motivating example of the
United States in Section 2.1 and then discuss the mechanism of tax deferral in Section 2.2. The
evolution of stock ownership is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 constructs independent variables,
such as tax benets of tax-deferral. Section 5.1 presents the main empirical analysis, Section 5.2
provides a number of robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes. Appendix A discusses data sources
and construction of aggregate stock and bond ownership. Appendix B provides details on the tax
rules in each of the sample countries.
2 Tax Benets of Pensions
2.1 Motivating Example: Evolution of the U.S. Pension and Mutual Fund In-
dustries
The development of the U.S. pension and mutual fund industries provides a vivid and potentially
surprising illustration of how government policy shaped long-term nancial institutional structure
and induced hysteresis. It is surprising because mutual funds constitute today a large part of the
nancial markets and a sizeable eld in nancial economics has evolved over the past two decades











































The top two gures show, respectively, the fraction of pension fund stock and bond ownership in percent
of all U.S. stocks and bonds (excluding savings bonds and municipal bonds). The two gures below are
the corresponding fractions of mutual fund stock and bond ownership. The two mutual fund gures also
mark the introduction of 401(k) in 1982. Source: Flow of Funds.
6to study various issues related to mutual funds. As pointed out in the Introduction, as late as
1982, all the domestic mutual funds taken together owned less than 3% of all the U.S. stocks and
less than 1% of all the U.S.-issued bonds. These numbers underlie the dramatic growth over these
twenty years: today, it is 25% and 12% for stocks and bonds, respectively.3 Importantly, most
mutual fund data sets start in the 1980s, such as the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund
Database that begins in 1982. Our claim is that much of this dramatic growth as well as the long-
term evolution of pension and mutual fund industries, and thus, of the ownership structure of U.S.
nancial assets, is driven by government policy such as taxation. In this section we rst describe
the evolution of the mutual and pension fund industries, then provide estimates of the fraction of
tax-deferred assets under the management of the mutual fund industry today, and nally sum up
the economic mechanism that we believe is likely responsible for the observed correlation.
Figure 1 plots the complete time-series of stock and bond domestic ownership shares of U.S.
pension funds and mutual funds. As the gure clearly shows, by the early 1980s, pension funds
owned a large fraction of stocks and bonds with the peak reached in 1985 at 28% and in 1982 at
20%, respectively. At the same time, mutual funds owned an insignicant fraction of stocks and
bonds in 1982. From the long-term historical perspective, pension funds had been steadily growing
since the late 1940s while the maximum ownership of mutual funds between 1945 and 1982 is only
at around 5% for stocks and less than 2% for bonds. However, institutional arrangements for
both pension and mutual funds in the United States have venerable nancial and legal history. A
benchmark pension fund legislation dates back to the Revenue Act of 1921 that introduced taxation
of pension contracts backed by assets held by a company pension fund. The mutual fund regulation
dates back to the Investment Company Act of 1940. Historical evidence allows us, however, to date
the appearance of pension funds to at least the late XIXth century and mutual funds to at least
1924. Despite that, even though the popularity of pension funds kicked o in the late 1940s, mutual
funds do not pick up until the mid 1980s. What is the reason for that?
An explanation that ts all these facts is based on the evolution of the way tax deferral of
nancial assets has been regulated over time and the extent of income taxation. Prior to the early
3Appendix A describes the methodology of constructing the ownership numbers as well as the data sources used
in this section.
71980s, the dominant form of tax-deferred saving was via dened-benet plans that was managed
by pension funds as Figure 1 demonstrates. As we detail in Section 4.3, even though the pension
fund legislation dates back to 1921, the regime of high eective tax rates started only in the rst
half of the 1940s giving rise to the proliferation of pension funds around that time. The tax-related
government policies had a long-lasting impact on the evolution of the pension fund industry.
The 401(k) legislation, enacted in 1978, paved the way for the widespread adoption of dened-
contribution plans. However, it became operational only in 1982 after the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA 1981) that specied the contribution limits for 401(k) plans. This legislation
naturally made mutual funds carry two important economic factors that pension funds could not do.
First, 401(k) accounts are driven by individual employee decisions and are thus built through payroll
deductions collecting small and frequent contributions. That makes pooling small transactions in
one fund benecial from the point of view of economizing on transaction costs, and this naturally
gives rise to mutual funds. Second, dened benet plans are not portable in that it is dicult to
transfer them between jobs and thus they are costlier to employees. Specically, dened benet
plans are not portable because they are based on the nal salary at age 65. (Thus, a worker who
leaves prematurely will receive a small pension compared to a worker who hangs on until age 65.)
The 1978 and 1981 reforms created demand for dened-contribution plans managed by mutual
funds from both employers and employees and correspondingly reduced demand for pension funds.
As Figure 1 shows, there is a dramatic growth in domestic stock and bond ownership managed by
mutual funds since the mid 1980s. Of course, for our purposes the major question is: What fraction
of these are actually held in tax-deferred accounts? In the absence of precise numbers, the following
back-of-the-envelope estimation is telling. As of 2009, which is the latest data point we have from
Investment Company Institute (ICI (2010)), the aggregate value of tax-deferred investments in
mutual funds held inside retirement accounts equals $2,300 billion in stocks (Figure 12; sum of
the domestic stock mutual funds and 70% of hybrid funds) and $1,200 billion in bonds (sum of
the domestic bond mutual funds and 30% of hybrid funds). In 2009, Flow of Funds Table L.122
reports that mutual funds manage approximately $4,100 billion in stocks and $2,700 billion in
bonds. Dividing the ICI numbers with the Flow of Funds totals, we see that the tax-deferred
8portion of stock mutual funds equals to 2,300/4,100=56% and bonds 1,200/2,700=44%.4
Our main message here is simple: the fraction of tax-deferred assets managed by mutual funds,
even using conservative estimates which are unlikely to overestimate the fraction signicantly, is
economically very large, with direct economic implications such as the sensitivity of investors'
behavior to the twists in the taxation of dividends and capital gains.
The example of the U.S. pension and mutual fund industries provides an illustration that
government policy may have been the driving force behind the evolution of nancial institutions,
specically the rise and changing nature and inuence of various types of nancial intermediaries.
A natural and rst-order explanation of the dramatic rise of mutual funds, overlooked by the
generation of nancial economists, lies in tax and pension government policies. To sum up, our
claim is that the existence not only of pension but also of mutual funds as we know them owes
much to the government tax and pension legislation driven by the then contemporary economic
forces but having long-term consequences.
Although these examples are telling, we need systematic evidence to relate the ownership of
nancial assets to tax-related policies. For this, the data from the United States are not sucient
because it provides us with only one time-series with insucient time series variation. Therefore,
we proceed by carefully constructing two data sets: one, of marginal personal tax rates for a
number of countries, and, two, the evolution of ownership of nancial assets for the same cross-
section of countries. This will allow us to study tax-ownership patterns for a multi-country panel.
We also need to understand better the exact economic mechanisms through which tax deferral is
benecial because understanding such mechanisms will enable us to construct empirical proxies for
our empirical analysis. The next section accomplishes that task.
4An alternative estimation is as follows. Pension funds manage simultaneously dened benet plans and 401(k)-
type accounts (e.g., TIAA{CREF). The latter are outsourced to the mutual fund industry. From Flow of Funds,
Tables L.118{120, we see that, in 2009, pension funds have $2,000 billion invested in mutual fund shares. Dividing
this number by the mutual fund total gives us 2,000/6,800 30%. Hence, assuming that pension funds invest
proportionally in stock and bond mutual fund shares, 30% is an absolutely minimum estimate of the tax-deferred
portion of stock mutual fund shares through pension funds. From ICI, Figure 4, we know that $2,000 worth of
IRAs are invested in mutual funds. Adding this number and keeping the proportionality assumption, our estimate
of the tax-deferred portion becomes 4,000/6,800 60%. These numbers are consistent with Poterba and Samwick
(1995) who state that two thirds of mutual fund assets are tax deferred. Sialm and Starks (2010) report an average
tax-deferred fraction of 25% taking an equally-weighted average.
92.2 Economic mechanisms of tax deferral
In this section, we present the simplest stylized setting that allows us to explain two economic mech-
anisms that provide benets of tax deferral, namely, income smoothing and untaxed investment
income. Despite its simplicity, our setting is nevertheless applicable as a rough rst approximation
to understand the principles of tax deferral. As an example, in the United States, according to
the principles for the taxation of pensions that date back to the Revenue Act of 1921, which states
that employer and employee contributions to private pension plans are made before tax, invest-
ment returns grow tax free, and distributions are taxed as personal income.5 In the parlance of
public economics, tax deferral implies the consumption-tax treatment of pensions as opposed to the
income-tax treatment of regular savings, where contributions are taxed at the time of investment,
investment returns are taxed upon realization, but distributions are exempt from personal tax.
To illustrate the argument in the simplest possible way, suppose there is only one risk-free asset
in the economy and all the parameters are known constants. An individual chooses between saving
inside or outside a pension plan. The annual rate of return is r and the time to retirement is N
years. Personal income is taxed at rate 0 when it is earned and at rate w when it is withdrawn.
Investment returns outside the pension plan are taxed at rate i;i = 1;:::;N.
Consider an individual who decides to set aside $100 pre-tax money for retirement. If he invests
outside the pension plan, the after-tax payo after N years equals:
WS = [100(1   0)]  [1 + r(1   i)]N: (1)
Equation (1) shows that savings are taxed at rate 0 when income is earned and at rate i when
capital income is reinvested. Hence, household savings outside the pension plan are taxed twice.






 (1   w): (2)
5The consumption-tax treatment of funded pension schemes appears to be the general principle across countries.
France has an unfunded private pension plan (pay as you go) that is an exception.
10Contributions to the pension plan can be made with pre-tax money, investment returns grow tax
free, and distributions are taxed at rate w. Hence, savings inside the pension plan are taxed only
once. Equations (1) and (2) are equal and the individual is indierent between saving outside or
inside the pension plan if 0 = w and i = 0 for all i.
This implies that saving inside the pension plan oers two potential tax benets. First, the
individual benets from income smoothing when the tax schedule is progressive and 0 > w, i.e.,
the individual reduces his lifetime tax burden by saving when income is high and withdrawing when
income is low. Second, investment returns inside the pension plan grow tax free, i = 0.
This simple argument abstracts from a number of realistic features, some of which we identify
here. Although we do not explicitly account for corporate tax, it does not matter in most countries
because wages and contributions to private pension funds are both tax deductible expenses for the
rm.6 It also does not account for other taxes such as social security taxes which add an additional
benet to tax deferral because they aect Equation (1) but not Equation (2).7 It also ignores
uncertainty in asset returns as well as in retirement age even though both can be relatively easily
added.8 Because our argument considers only one asset, we also ignore the asset location problem.
As argued in a series of important papers (Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004) and Huang (2008)),
tax incentives can tilt the tax-deferred account towards bonds and taxable accounts towards stocks.
Empirically, we know (see Appendix A) that in the aggregate, the stock-bond split in U.S. pension
fund portfolios is 70/30, and 70% of households' tax-deferred assets are in stocks (according to
Bergstresser and Poterba (2004), based on the Survey of Consumer Finances 1998). As such, there
is a strong preference for stocks inside these accounts and, therefore, even though such tilting may
constitute an important economic activity, it is unlikely to invalidate the two economic mechanisms
6In Germany, Japan, and Sweden, where pension liabilities are held on the books, contributions are made before
tax, but corporate tax must be paid, when the book reserves are dissolved. Hence, corporate tax is deferred along
with personal tax.
7Contributions to the Social Security system are levied on wages, but not on employer contributions to private
pension plans. Escaping social security tax is, therefore, an additional tax benet of saving inside a pension plan
that we ignore. Social security taxes are capped and, therefore, irrelevant at higher income levels that matter more
for contributions to private pension plans. There are exceptions. In the United States, the cap on payments into the
public health system (Medicare) was removed in 1990 and in Sweden, where social security tax rates are quite high,
the cap on social security contributions was removed in 1968.
8The net eect of interest rate uncertainty is ambiguous. Interest rate uncertainty increases the income from
indirect ownership because WS and WP are convex functions. On the other hand, interest rate uncertainty increases
the volatility of income because the variance of before-tax income is higher than the variance of after-tax income.
11we describe.
3 The Evolution of Stock Ownership
Our main goal is to relate the long-term changes in the structure of ownership of nancial assets to
government policies such as taxes and pension legislation. Accomplishing this goal requires cross-
country analysis to explore the time-series variation in government policies. Although the raw
historical data on personal tax legislation is available for a wide array of countries, the long-term
data on ownership are much more dicult to come by. Therefore, in our analysis we are guided by
eight countries for which we were able to nd and construct the data on long-term stock ownership.9
In this section, we provide the overall description of the long-term evolution of the distribution of
stock ownership in the sample countries. The main nding of this descriptive section is that the
direct ownership of stocks by households has declined precipitously over the past half a century in
all eight sample countries and has been picked up to a large extent by nancial institutions.10
Importantly, although we concentrate only on eight countries, existing data for recent years for a
much wider range of countries provide corroborative evidence for this nding. Figure 2 summarizes
the fraction of direct household ownership in recent years for twenty countries with developed stock
markets. There is not a single country where households own more than 30% of the equity market
directly, with the average across countries being just 17%. As can be seen from the gure, our
sample covers the whole spectrum of current ownership structure, from 4.7% in Norway to 28.3%
in Canada.
We rst discuss how we constructed and adjusted ownership data to make cross-country com-
9We were able to nd relatively short-term series for various other countries (Norway 1985{2006; Australia 1988{
2006; Italy 1995{2006) but the series were too short to be included in the analysis.
10A natural extension of our study would be look at the evolution of the household bond ownership. One may
conjecture that direct bond ownership should decline substantially in line with the stock ownership. However, we
were able to nd the high-quality long-term historical bond ownership data only for the United States (and a shorter
series for Canada starting in 1961) The main feature of the U.S. bond ownership time series is that households own
less than 10% of the total bond market since the start of the World War II when massive bond issuance by the U.S.
government was absorbed by banks. Households' direct bond ownership remains low ever since. For example, over the
past twenty years, excluding our estimates of non-prot ownership and bond ownership in IRA accounts, household
direct ownership of taxable debt is in the range of about 10%. Given very low values of this variable throughout the
whole period, there is no room for a response to tax incentives. The Canadian data are consistent with this analysis.
Details are available from the authors upon request.












The gure shows the aggregate fraction of household direct ownership of equity in 21 coun-
tries. The data are from 2006 or the most recent available; the data for the United States
are from 2010. The black bars indicate the country is in our data set. Data sources: Flow
of Funds (United States), Statistics Canada, Australian Bureau of Statistics, FESE (2007),
Goldman & Sachs (New Zealand), and Nordic Central Securities Depository (Finland and
Sweden). The number for the United States has been adjusted for the ownership of closely-
held rms and non-prot organizations. The number for Canada has been adjusted for
closely-held equity.
parisons possible. Then, we analyze the data by studying the extent of the decline in household
direct ownership and exploring common patterns of stock ownership evolution.
3.1 Stock Ownership Data
Annual ownership statistics exist for the United States since 1945, Japan 1949, Germany 1950,
Canada 1961, and France 1977. Time-series of ownership data for Sweden begin 1950, United
Kingdom 1957, and Finland 1958, but data are incomplete and only available for some years.11
The U.S. ownership data are constructed by the Federal Reserve.12 The direct household own-
ership is estimated as a residual in a calculation which starts with the market value of listed stocks,
adds an estimate of the book value of non-listed stocks, eliminates inter-corporate ownership, and
subtracts the ownership of domestic nancial institutions and foreigners. Even though this residual
11All data sources can be found in the notes of Figures 3a and 3b.
12Reported in the Flow of Funds. One additional issue we have encountered in using the U.S. ownership data is
that the Federal Reserve tends to revise its estimates, at times to a non-trivial extent. The data we use are based on
the 2010 version of the data.
13is labeled by the Federal reserve as the \household sector," it contains non-listed stocks as well as
ownership of non-prot organizations and thus is likely upward biased relative to the fraction of
direct household ownership reported in the data for other sample countries.13 The bias arising from
non-listed stocks can be estimated from the dierence between the Flow of Funds total and stock
market capitalizations, and the ownership of non-prot organizations is available from 1987{2000
(Table L.100a). To make the U.S. data comparable to that of other sample countries, we use the
adjusted household sector ownership by subtracting the value of non-listed stocks and our estimate
of the ownership of non-prot organizations. Non-listed stocks and non-prot organizations account
for approximately four percentage points each of the household sector. Correcting for these biases,
the fraction of household ownership in the United States is 30% as of 2006.14 It is important to note
that in our regression analysis in Section 5.1, the dependent variable is the change in household
ownership, and thus all these adjustments have no inuence on the results.
The Canadian ownership shares are constructed as in the United States except that the total
is dened as the book value of listed and non-listed stocks. The household sector is derived as the
residual and consists of actual households and non-prot organizations. Therefore, the Canadian
household sector is also upward biased. The book value of listed and non-listed stocks exceeds the
market value of listed stocks by 26% over the 1980{2005 period. Therefore, we adjust the fractions
from Statistics Canada by the overshooting 26%. Specically, for households, we subtract 0.26 from
the observed fraction of household ownership and divide by 0.74. For all others sectors, we divide
the observed fraction of ownership by 0.74. The adjusted fraction of household ownership in 2006
is 28.3%. Inter-corporate ownership is explicit, but quite small.
The Japanese ownership shares are reported as fractions of the number of shares outstanding
before 1970 and as fractions of market values from 1970 onwards. Given that households tend to
hold a larger share of small cap stocks, the aggregate household ownership share in 1949{1970 is
likely to be overestimated. For the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden, the ownership
shares are fractions of market values. The UK ownership statistics are based on company surveys
13The Federal Reserve estimate is also in principle biased downwards because it eliminates inter-corporate owner-
ship. However, it is likely this bias is very small.
14Poterba and Samwick (1995) and French (2008) make further attempts to adjust the household sector.
14with the most recent ownership statistics from the share registry. The ocial share registry is also
the basis for the ownership statistics from recent years in Sweden (since 1975) and Finland (since
1994). The older data from Sweden and Finland are compiled using a variety of methods.15
An important caveat is that in all countries direct household ownership includes insider/managerial
ownership, which ideally for our purposes we would have liked to exclude. Some estimates for the
Unites States between 1993 and 2004 suggest that insider ownership is around 7%.16 The problem
is that the extent of insider ownership as well as the forms it takes are likely to be dierent across
our sample, which our data do not allow us to adjust for.
3.2 The Evolution of Stock Ownership
Figures 3a and 3b plot the complete time-series of household and institutional ownership (pension
funds, investment funds, and insurance companies) for the sample countries (the composition of
the institutional variable for each country is given at the bottom of the gures).17 We use dif-
ferent symbols, diamonds versus lines, to mark the merger of time-series with dierent qualities.
Households are represented by solid diamonds and solid lines, and nancial institutions by open
diamonds and dashed lines. Several observations stand out.
First, in all countries the long-term decline of direct household ownership is dramatic, from
around 20% in Germany and Canada to above 50% in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. The equally-weighted average of the decline across all the countries is 40%. Second,
a substantial fraction of household-owned assets is picked up by nancial institutions. The average
increase in domestic nancial institutions' ownership is 24%. Not shown in the gures, the rest of
household ownership is shifted mostly to foreigners (who are mostly nancial institutions), especially
after the removal of capital controls in the 1980s and early 1990s (OECD (2002)).18 Third, there
15Sweden: the 1950 data are based on a survey of household nances by Statistics Sweden. The 1961 and 1970 data
are computed as the residual from point estimates of the portfolios of nancial institutions and business corporations.
The ownership fractions are based on market values. Finland: the 1958 data are based on tax-assessed values, the
1972 data on market values, and the 1980{1986 data on nominal share values.
16Authors' own estimates based on manually collected proxy data for S&P1500 rms using the EDGAR data
service.
17We decided to report unadjusted values for the United States because the long-term series of non-prot ownership
is not available. This accounts for the discrepancy between Figures 2 and 3a.
18Capital controls in most developed countries were adopted in preparation for or during World War II or in the
immediate reconstruction period after the war. Canada removed its capital controls in 1951 and Germany in 1958.





































The gure shows the percentage aggregate ownership fraction of households (solid diamonds and lines)
and nancial institutions (open diamonds and dashed lines) dened as pension funds, mutual funds, and
either life insurance companies or property and life insurance companies combined. In Canada, we also
include Social Security funds and, in Sweden, investment and holding companies. Data sources: Flow of
Funds (United States); Statistics Canada; Revell and Moyle (1966), Moyle (1971), and Statistics United
Kingdom; Sp ant (1975), Boman (1982), and Statistics Sweden.





































The gure shows the percentage aggregate ownership fraction of households (solid diamonds and lines)
and nancial institutions (open diamonds and dashed lines) dened as pension funds, mutual funds, and
either life insurance companies or property and life insurance companies combined. In Japan, nancial
institutions include trust banks, investment trusts, annuity trusts, and insurance companies. Data sources:
the Shareholder Survey and the Fact Book of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Japan); Deutsches Aktieninstitut
(Germany); Bank of France; Grandell (1959), Laakso (1979), Airaksinen and Kallinen (1987), Karhunen
and Keloharju (2001) (Finland).
17is substantial within-panel heterogeneity. To see this further, Table 1 reports for each country the
average decline in the fraction of household ownership per year for the whole period as well as for
three subperiods. As the table clearly demonstrates, the panel exhibits heterogeneity both across
time (decline in the 1970s-80s is larger in most countries than in other decades) and across countries
in each subperiod.
Table 1: Annual Change in the Fraction of Household Ownership
Sub-periods
1945{2010 1950{1969 1970{1989 1990{2010
Sweden {0.99 {0.69 {1.84 {0.34
United Kingdom {1.10 {1.53 {1.34 {0.43
United States {0.88 {0.57 {1.15 {0.97
Finland {0.94 {0.36 {1.05 {1.23
Japan {0.86 {1.40 {0.92 {0.14
Germany {0.62 {0.83 {0.48 {0.56
France {0.81 n.a. {0.17 {1.29
Canada {0.32 0.28 {0.16 {0.80
#Observations 396 110 152 134
The table shows the annual change in the fraction of household ownership in percent of stock market capital-
ization. The countries have been sorted from low to high in the 1970{1989 column.
4 Empirical Analysis of Tax Benets
This section provides estimates of annual tax benets of pensions for eight countries in our sample
(Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom, Unites States) over long
periods of time. We choose the panel to match the stock ownership data the availability of which
over the long horizon is constrained to these eight countries. We start by constructing proxies
that capture the two economic mechanisms outlined above. Then we proceed by describing the
estimation of marginal tax rates and presenting the time-series of these tax rates for each country
The United States had capital controls in place during the Vietnam War (1963{1973). The process of removing
capital controls began in the United Kingdom in 1979 and continued in Japan 1980, France 1986, Sweden 1989, and
Finland 1991.
18in the sample. Finally, we present and discuss the time series of tax benets of pensions for each
country, which is the main goal of this section.
The soundness of our empirical analysis to a large extent depends on the quality of understand-
ing the rules of how dividends and capital gains are taxed to construct the reliable and consistent
measures of marginal tax rates, and thus our empirical proxies of the tax benets. To construct
the tax benet data set, we used historical tax tables for each country in the sample, taking into
account the specic features of treatment of personal income taxation for each country and each
year. Appendix B provides detailed discussion of our data sources and, for each country, it lists
the formulas we used to construct all tax-related variables.
4.1 Empirical Proxies
4.1.1 Tax-Exempt Investment Income
A good empirical proxy of the benet of avoiding tax on investment income should reect the
dierence between the real rate of return from holdings assets inside and outside the pension plan.
Because investor care about real returns, but taxation is virtually always on nominal returns, it
is important to adjust any tax-induced dierences in returns by expected ination. Although tax
benets will accrue to any taxable asset, because our cross-country data is mostly on stocks, we
tailor our proxy to reect return from holding stocks.
Let d be the expected dividend yield, g the expected capital gains rate, and d and g the
marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains, respectively. The expected rate of return from
holding stocks inside the pension plan is:
rP = (1 + d)(1 + g)   1  d + g; (3)
and the expected rate of return from direct stock ownership outside the pension plan is:
rS = [1 + d(1   d)]  [1 + g(1   g)]   1  (1   d)d + (1   g)g: (4)
If i denotes the expected ination rate, then the proxy, that we denote GAP, is naturally the





It is important to note that because capital gains taxation is nominal, expected ination is implicitly
also present in the capital gains growth rate g. Also, taxation on nominal income implies that
ination pushes taxpayers over time into higher marginal tax brackets (commonly known as \bracket
creep") and thus may change the identity of the marginal tax payer, an important empirical feature.
4.1.2 Income Smoothing
A proxy for income smoothing should reect tax benets from shifting income from high-income
work years to low-income retirement years. These tax benets are larger for more progressive tax
systems. To construct a simple proxy capturing this eect, we consider a constant lifetime income
model under certainty (Ippolito (1986)). Also, to isolate the pure eect of income smoothing,
we assume zero risk-free interest rate.19 Specically, assume that an individual works N years
and needs retirement income for M years. Let Y denote his annual income and T(Y ) the total
tax liability on this income. Under a progressive tax system, tax liability is minimized when the
individual chooses the same pre-tax income rate  = N=(N +M) throughout his lifetime. Figure 4
shows an example where the number of work years is N = 40, time in retirement is M = 13 years,
and annual income during work years is normalized at Y = 1. Smoothed over lifetime, annual
income decreases to Y = 13=53  0:75.
If the individual makes regular savings outside the pension plan, his lifetime tax liability equals:
TS = N  T(Y ): (6)
If instead the individual saves inside the pension plan, his annual tax liability is reduced to T(Y )
19The assumptions of certainty and zero interest are inconsequential because the only eect is to shift the level of
the smoothing benet and we are interested in relative comparisons across country and time. A more volatile income
stream as well as a growing income stream will make our proxy larger, and positive interest will make it smaller.













The gure shows annual pre-tax income (solid line) during work years and annual pre-tax income
if smoothed over work and retirement years (dashed line).
and so the lifetime tax liability becomes:
TP = (N + M)  T(Y ): (7)
The proxy for income smoothing, that we denote SMOOTH, can naturally be constructed as the





4.2 Data and Estimation
We rst discuss the construction of the marginal tax rate data. Then, we provide details of all
non-tax data and parameters we use in the analysis.
4.2.1 Marginal Tax Rates
We construct a proxy for the marginal tax rate of a representative household that chooses between
holding stocks inside or outside a pension plan. Importantly, this proxy should satisfy a number of
21criteria. First, it should be estimated consistently across years and countries so that it facilitates
our empirical analysis. A convenient and robust method to ensure this is to calculate marginal
tax rates for households at annual incomes for each multiple of GDP-per-capita, which is easy to
compute from statutory tax tables. We denote with GDPk the household taxable income equal
to GDP per capita times a multiple k. Second, it should exclude very low income multiples as
poor households are unlikely to own any nancial assets, and because government-provided public
pensions such as social security crowd out any desire of these households to save for retirement.
As our base case, we assume that the representative household has an annual income of ve times
GDP per capita (GDP5). For example, the U.S. GDP per capita in 2009 is $46,000 and thus the
marginal tax rates for that year will be estimated in the base case for a household with an income
of $230,000. While the choice of this multiple is somewhat arbitrary, extensive robustness tests
show that our results are not materially aected when we vary k (see Section 5.2).
Dividends are generally taxed as ordinary income, even though many tax codes oer a dividend-
tax relief to reduce the eects of double taxation of corporate income.20 Capital gains taxation
is markedly dierent from dividend taxation.21 The statutory tax rate on long-term capital gains
is usually lower than the statutory rate on short-term gains and it is often zero; in addition, in
all countries capital gains tax can be postponed until the stock is sold. The value of deferral of
capital gains has been subject to much debate. Miller (1977) refers to conventional folk wisdom
that 10 years of tax deferral is almost as good as exemption from tax. Bailey (1969) calculates the
value of deferral as 50% of the statutory rate, Protopapadakis (1983) nds estimates in the order of
25%, and Chay, Choi, and Ponti (2006) nd it to be 55%. Green and Hollield (2003) model the
advantage of deferral and nd numerically that the eective tax rate on capital gains amounts to
approximately 50{60% of the statutory rate. For the base case scenario, we therefore assume that
the eective capital gains tax rate is 50% of the long-term statutory rate evaluated at the annual
income ve times GDP per capita.22
20Dividend-tax relief was introduced in the following years: Canada 1949, Japan 1950, France 1965, United Kingdom
1973, Germany 1977, Sweden 1991, Finland 1993, and the United States 2003. See Appendix B for more details.
21The United States begins taxing capital gains on stocks in 1916, but elsewhere taxation of long-term capital gains
is relatively recent: United Kingdom 1965, Sweden 1967, Canada 1972, and Finland 1986. In Germany, France, and
Japan, long-term capital gains on stocks are eectively tax exempt throughout the time period we study.
22For robustness, we also varied the capital gains deferral parameter without materially aecting the results as
224.2.2 Non-Tax Data
GDP per capita is taken from International Monetary Fund (2009), dividend yields are from Global
Financial Data, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is from International Historical Statistics
(Mitchell (2007)). Life-expectancy statistics are available from the Human Mortality Database.23
Estimates of expected dividend yield and capital gains rate are intrinsically noisy. We make
simple rst-order approximations and pursue a number of robustness checks. In the base case,
we assume that the expected dividend yield, d, is 4%, and that the expected capital gains rate
is 2% plus expected ination measured as a three-year moving average of changes in CPI.24 The
assumptions on dividend yield (4%) and capital gains yield (2% plus ination) imply that the
expected real rate of return on stocks is approximately 6% before tax, which is within the range
reported by Fama and French (2002) between 1951 and 2000: 4.74% using the dividend growth
model and 6.51% using the earnings growth model. The dividend yield parameter is similar to the
pooled cross-section and time-series average dividend yield in our sample (3.6%). There are two
caveats to using this average as a dividend yield parameter. First, the time-series of cross-country
average dividend yields exhibit a long-term downward-moving trend, from 5.3% in 1950 to 2.3% in
2006.25 Second, we treat payout policy as exogenous and do not allow for supply-side adjustments
to changes in tax policy.26
As standard in asset pricing literature, we approximate the expected real dividend growth rate
with the average real GDP-per-capita growth rate.27 The real growth rate is also non-stationary.
Section 5.2 shows.
23University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Avail-
able at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de.
24Arguably, ination and long-term bond yields are mean reverting. However, as the time-series of actual long-term
bond yields follow the three-year moving average ination rate, a more sophisticated ination-forecast model will not
change any of the results.
25Substantially lower dividend yields in the United States and United Kingdom after 1982 can partially be explained
by a dramatic increase in popularity of share repurchases following changes in regulations.
26Possible feedback mechanisms between payout policies and taxes are complex. Specically, although higher
income tax may lead rms to cut back their dividends and raise capital gains, the possible eect of higher capital
gains tax is the opposite. Higher income tax may also reduce investments and thereby future dividends and capital
gains. Empirically, very little is known. Many papers studied the eects of the dividend tax cut in 2003 (the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003). As this evidence is based on a single event, researchers debate
whether the experiment is contaminated by other changes that take place around the time of the dividend tax cut
(see Julio and Ikenberry (2004), Chetty and Saez (2005), and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2008)).
27Asset pricing papers that emanate from the consumption-based capital asset pricing model of Lucas (1978)
measure aggregate consumption as GDP per capita, and therefore consumption growth as changes in GDP per capita.
23The geometric average real GDP growth rate in the pooled sample is 2.9%, but the average decreases
as we exclude the earlier data and measure it over recent years. Since 1990, the geometric average
real GDP growth rate is only 1.4%. In robustness tests in Section 5.2, we replicate our results
varying both the dividend yield and the growth rate. We also experiment with moving-average
estimates of the two parameters.
The numerical value of the tax benet to income smoothing depends on demographic parame-
ters. In the base case, we assume that an individual begins contributing to a pension plan at the age
of 25 and retires at the age of 65.28 We assume that households use life-expectancy statistics to pre-
dict the number of years in retirement. For each country in our sample, we collect life-expectancy
conditional on age 25 and compute the cross-country average of male and female life expectancy.
Across countries, the time-series of average life expectancy begins at 70 years in 1950 and ends at
81 years in 2006. These numbers imply that the number of work years is N = 40 and the number
of retirement years is M 2 [6:4;16:4]. The number of retirement years is an approximately linearly
increasing function of time. Accordingly, the importance of saving for retirement increases over
time.29
4.3 Evolution on Personal Income Tax on Stocks
In this section, we present and discuss the evolution of personal income tax. The sequence of plots
contained in Figures 5a{5d shows the evolution of marginal tax rates. In all plots, the solid line
above is the top statutory rate on ordinary income, and the dashed line below is the top statutory
rate on dividends. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory tax rate (solid line) are the top
income tax brackets expressed as multiples of GDP per capita. Below the top statutory rates, we
Examples include Grossman and Shiller (1981) and Mehra and Prescott (1985). Traditional nance research estimate
aggregate income growth from stock price indices, dividend series, and corporate earnings series. For example, Fama
and French (2002) report that stock prices grow by 5.92% from 1951{2000, dividends 1.05%, and corporate earnings
2.74%. Presumably, all these measures of aggregate income are co-integrated. We use GDP per capita, which is most
easily available for countries other than the United States.
28Retirement at 65 has long been the norm in the countries we study. It was chosen in the social security system
of the United Kingdom in 1925 and in the United States in 1935.
29For simplicity, we ignore the change in life expectancy between the ages of 25 and 65, i.e., we assume that
a household that starts saving for retirement in 1950 uses the life expectancy statistical tables of 1950 to plan for
retirement that begins forty years later in 1990. This assumption has no other consequence than shifting the numerical
value of SMOOTH. See Footnote 19 above.
24plot our proxies for the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and capital gains (triangles) of
the GDP5 household.
The top panel of Figure 5a shows the evolution of marginal tax rates in the United States.
We assume that state tax is a constant 5%. The top statutory rate on ordinary income equals
the top statutory rate on dividends between 1950 and 2002. Since 2003, dividends are taxed
at a lower rate. (This change in the tax code is represented by the dashed line.) Even though
the top statutory income tax rate is exceedingly high at the beginning of the sample (91.45{92.4%
between 1950 and 1964), it is relevant to a few households. Over the same period, the top statutory
income tax rate is activated only for households with a multiple 115{206 (for married couples led
jointly). The marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains for the GDP5 household are, in fact,
substantially lower, at 30{33%. Over long time, two opposite forces aect the marginal tax rates.
First, the top statutory income tax rate gradually and substantially declines to the level below
40% after TRA 1986. This tends to reduce marginal tax rates. Second, the multiple at which the
top statutory rate is activated declines precipitously from 222 in 1950 to just 6{8 over the past
20 years. The second eect, bracket creep, which increases marginal tax rates, dominates between
1965 and 1980. Thus, over that period the GDP5 household experienced substantial increase in its
tax burden despite reduction in top tax rates. The Reagan reforms of 1982 and 1986 reverse the
bracket creep which leads to the prevalence of the rst eect. In addition, TRA 1986 introduces
automatic ination indexation which virtually removes the second eect. The capital gains tax rate
(triangles) is approximately constant around 10%.
The comparison of the evolution of tax rates between various countries in our sample provides
the most direct justication for using a cross-country panel to address our research questions. The
plots clearly demonstrate that there are substantial time-series and cross-sectional dierences in
tax rates that will allow us to use within-panel variation. For example, the treatment of dividend
tax reliefs is very dierent across the countries. As another striking example, capital gains tax is
absent in France, Germany, and Japan for the whole period and in other countries for extensive
periods, with the United States being the only country that imposes capital gains tax throughout
the whole period.




































































The gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of
the GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are top income brackets of
representative years expressed in multiples of GDP per capita. In Japan, the marginal tax rate
depends on the size of the dividend from each company. Cases I, II, and III refer to a large, an
intermediate, and a small dividend, respectively.

































































The gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are top income
brackets of representative years expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.






























































The gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are top income
brackets of representative years expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.





























































The gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are top income
tax brackets of representative years expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.
29At the same time, the evolution of tax systems share a number of common features. In the
rst decade after World War II, high top statutory rates on personal income are coupled with low
marginal tax rates for the GDP5 household. In the subsequent decades, marginal tax rates drift
upwards (bracket creep), and the GDP-per-capita multiple at the top statutory rate decreases from
an average well above 100 in 1950 to around 10 in 1980. In the extreme cases of Sweden and
Finland (Figure 5c), the marginal tax rates of the GDP5 household are equal to the top statutory
rates in the 1970s and 1980s, and the top statutory rate applies to an income multiple of only two.
The bracket creep, that ended with TRA 1986 in the United States, faced similar tax reforms in
other countries: the United Kingdom 1988, Japan 1989, Sweden 1991, and Finland 1993. In all
the countries, the marginal tax rates of the GDP5 household become similar to top statutory rates
over the past 20 years but top statutory rates are much lower than in the past.
4.4 Tax Benets of Pensions
In this section, we study the time-series and cross-country properties of the two empirical proxies
of the tax benets of pensions, GAP and SMOOTH. Figure 6a and 6b show the evolution of GAP5
in each of the eight sample countries. The sample average GAP5 is about 2%, ranging from 1% in
Germany to 2.8% in the United Kingdom. To illustrate the economic importance of GAP, consider
the following simple example. If a household saves for retirement by placing $1 in a savings account
for 40 years at the pre-tax annual return of 6%, then if GAP is equal to 2%, the value of household's
account at the end of 40 years is $155 vs. $95, or a gain of more than 60% by shifting from outside
to inside pension account. The upshot is that for most sets of realistic parameters the GAP measure
has a substantial impact on household's economic well-being.
The gure demonstrates substantial cross-country and time-series variation in the GAP measure.
In the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden, the path is hump shaped, with GAP5 peaking
in the 1970s because of the increasing taxation of dividends (bracket creep) and capital gains
(higher ination eectively increases capital gains tax as taxation is levied on nominal changes
in stock prices). For example, in the United Kingdom, GAP5 peaks at nearly 6%, which implies
that, under our assumptions, the expected real rate of return on stocks after tax is approximately














































The gure shows the real rate of return dierence between saving inside and outside a pension plan for a
household with an income multiple of ve times GDP per capita (GAP5). The numbers are expressed in
percent. We assume that the expected dividend yield is d = 4%, expected real growth is g = 2%, and that
expected ination equals the three-year moving average. We also assume that the eective capital gains
tax rate equals 50% of the long-term statutory rate. Jumps caused by important tax reforms are marked
in the gure and explained in Appendix B.
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The gure shows the real rate of return dierence between saving inside and outside a pension plan for a
household with an income multiple of ve times GDP per capita (GAP5). The numbers are expressed in
percent. We assume that the expected dividend yield is d = 4%, expected real growth is g = 2%, and that
expected ination equals the three-year moving average. We also assume that the eective capital gains
tax rate equals 50% of the long-term statutory rate. Jumps caused by important tax reforms are marked
in the gure and explained in Appendix B.
32zero. At the same time, in France, Germany, and Japan, the response to the ination shock of the
1970s is minimal, because the eective dividend taxation is low (the dividend tax credit protects
against bracket creep) and capital gains are exempt from taxation. The importance of dividend tax
credits can be seen in the plots of the United States, United Kingdom Sweden, Germany, France,
and Finland where GAP5 decreases after tax reforms that relieve shareholders of double dividend
taxation. The eects of capital gains taxation are visible in Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden,
and Finland, where GAP5 increases after the introduction of capital gains taxation, as well as in
the United Kingdom 1982, where GAP5 drops after capital gains are protected against ination
through indexation.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the tax benet of income smoothing, proxied by SMOOTH5.
SMOOTH5 is almost always positive because personal tax tables are progressive, with the average
annual reduction in the tax bill in the pooled sample of 2.6%.30 In the United States and the
United Kingdom, the time-series of SMOOTH5 display the same hump-shaped path as GAP5, which
peaks in the 1970s when tax progressivity is high. Eectively, the GDP5 household moves upwards
into the more progressive part of the tax table because of the bracket creep. All the SMOOTH5
time-series exhibit an upward-sloping trend, which is explained by increasing life expectancy on the
smoothing benet. Precipitous drops in the late 1980s { early 1990s are the result of TRA 1986 in
the United States (marked on the plot) and similar tax reforms in other countries. The correlation
between GAP5 and SMOOTH5 in the pooled sample is relatively small at 0.17 implying that these
two proxies reect dierent economic channels.
5 Tax Benets of Pensions and the Evolution of Ownership
In this section we investigate to what extent government policies may have shaped the structure
of ownership of nancial assets. Our main conjecture is that households shifted their ownership
away from direct holdings as these became more tax disadvantaged and that the speed of this shift
has been related, both cross-sectionally and in time-series, by the strength of the tax dierential
30Rydqvist, Schwartz, and Spizman (2010) quantify the magnitude of the tax benet of income smoothing for the
Unites States in much more detail.
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The gure shows the tax benet to income smoothing for a household with an income multiple of ve
times GDP per capita (SMOOTH5). The numbers are expressed in percent. The calculations are based
on statutory tax tables, retirement age 65, average life expectancy conditional on age 25, and zero interest
rate.
34of direct vs. indirect holdings. The goal is thus to explore whether systematic evidence ts the
essence of the example of the U.S. mutual and pension fund industries, presented in Section 2.1.
5.1 Panel Evidence
To start with, we need to estimate households' aggregate response to the tax incentives to save
inside a pension plan. The dependent variable is the change in the fraction of household ownership,
y, and the independent variables are GAP5 and SMOOTH5. We estimate the following pooled
cross-section and time-series regression model:
yit = a + b  GAP5it + c  SMOOTH5it + eit: (9)
Our conjecture implies that the GAP5 and SMOOTH5 slope coecients, b and c, are negative.
It is important to emphasize that the incentives to save inside a pension plan are very slow-
moving variables. Any delayed response is likely to be highly correlated with the current values
of the incentive variables. Therefore, in the base case regression model, we run contemporaneous
regressions and do not include lagged independent variables. If there is an underlying time trend
in the fraction of household ownership such as the eect of increased life expectancy, then the time
trend is captured by the regression intercept. In our base case model, we also ignore that the fraction
of household ownership is bounded between zero and one and therefore the changes can depend on
the level of the dependent variable. Finally, we do not control for the possible country-specic time
trend.31 A number of variations in specication are addressed in our robustness tests.
As the time series of ownership are incomplete for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland,
particularly in the beginning of the sample period, missing values are replaced through a procedure
of random imputation. Specically, we interpolate the missing value as the average annual change





31When we allow the underlying time trend to vary across countries (i.e., country-xed eects), only the coecient
of the dummy variable for Canada is statistically dierent from zero.
35where n > 1 and the noise term is normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation
estimated from the portion of the data without missing data. Intuitively, the average change in
household ownership between two data points is our best guess for the missing value. The noise
term protects against underestimating the standard errors of the regressions.32 We use random
imputation to ll in the missing values for 91 of 396 observations, or 23% of the total sample.
For the individual countries, we impute 48% of the observations from Finland, 62% from Sweden,
and 72% from the United Kingdom. Since the imputed observations constitute a relatively large
portion of the sample, we simulate 100 paths and report average regression statistics. In the
robustness section, we compare the regression results of random imputation with other methods of
dealing with missing data. The estimation procedure corrects for rst-order autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity following the procedure of Parks (1967).33
Table 2 reports the results of estimating Equation (9). As the empirical model is specied in
rst dierences, we expect low levels of R2 coecients. Specication (1) reports only the average
annual change in household ownership across the eight countries. The average decline in the fraction
of household ownership is 0.75% per year. Specications (2){(4) include the tax proxy variables.
The coecient of GAP5 is signicantly dierent from zero, while the coecient of SMOOTH5 is
not. These results contrast with the mainstream view that income smoothing is important (e.g.
see Ippolito (1986) for a theoretical discussion).
Importantly, once we include the tax variables, the intercept term is not statistically dierent
from zero, which implies that the entire underlying time trend is due to the eect of taxation.
Economically, the magnitude of the regression coecient of GAP5 means that a three percentage
point dierence between saving inside and outside a pension plan results in an annual reduction
of the fraction of household ownership by one percentage point. When we break down GAP5 into
its components (Specications (3) and (4)), we see that the dividend term and the marginal tax
rates on dividends have explanatory power, but not the capital gains term, the marginal tax rate
32Standard software packages such as SAS, Stata, and SPSS include missing values procedures that explicitly take
the uncertainty of the imputed value into account. For an introduction to missing data analysis, see Howell (2008).
We thank David Howell and Subal Kumbhakar for commenting on the missing data procedure.
33Since the dependent variable is dened as the rst dierence, the residual autocorrelation is close to zero. We
nevertheless correct for the remaining autocorrelation using the same autocorrelation coecient for all the countries.
36Table 2: Pooled Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant {0.75 {0.20 {0.14 0.00
({8.5)







Capital gains term {21.0
({1.2)
Dividend tax rate {1.7
({3.0)





SMOOTH5 0.8 1.8 0.5
(0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
R
2 0.000 0.034 0.035 0.032
#Observations 396 396 396 396
The table reports the results of regressing the households' annual percentage ownership change on proxy
variables for the tax benets of saving inside a pension plan dened by equations (5) and (8). The proxy
variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the income ve times GDP per capita.
The regressions are estimated with generalized least squares. Missing data are replaced through random
imputation as described in the text. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coecients. Asterisk
,
, and
 denote signicance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better, respectively, against the null hypothesis
that the coecient is zero.
37on capital gains, or ination. These results suggest that dividend taxation matters for long-term
household behavior.
Table 3: Decade-by-Decade Regressions
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-10
Constant {0.66 0.32 0.15 0.58 {2.2 0.84
({0.7) (0.5) (0.2) (0.7) ({2.6)
 (1.0)





SMOOTH5 {50.5 {6.3 {16.8 {12.5 36.7 {9.5
({1.3) ({0.3) ({0.6) ({0.7) (2.4)
 ({0.5)
R
2 0.047 0.133 0.090 0.111 0.008 0.087
#Observations 37 68 72 80 80 53
The table reports the regression results decade by decade. The dependent variable is the households' annual
percentage ownership change and the independent variables are proxy variables for the tax benets of saving
inside a retirement account. The proxy variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the
income ve times GDP per capita. The regressions are estimated as in Table 2. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses below the coecients. Asterisk
,
, and
 denote signicance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better,
respectively, against the null hypothesis that the coecient is zero.
Once the economic signicance of tax variables is established, it is important to explore the time-
series and cross-country determinants of their impact. Table 3 reports the results of estimating the
regression model (9) decade by decade. For brevity, we report only the results using GAP5 and
SMOOTH5 as regressors. The coecient of GAP5 is statistically dierent from zero in the three
regressions covering the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, with a similar economic magnitude to the full panel
estimate. Statistical signicance varies, it is marginal in the 1960s and the 1970s and strong in the
1980s. These results demonstrate that the explanatory power of the regression model (9) is due
to the cross-sectional variation in marginal tax rates during the high-ination periods, suggesting
that bracket creep is a driving force behind household decisions.
The SMOOTH5 coecients are insignicant in each decade, conrming the results of Table 2.
A likely explanation of the statistical signicance of the intercept coecient in the 1990s is that the
decline in household ownership is driven by an increase in cross-border ownership once the capital
controls were widely abolished around that time. Although our data do not allow us to explore
this conjecture further, it is highly likely that nancial institutions are behind much of this foreign
38ownership. For example, Ferreira and Matos (2008) estimate that 60% of the U.S. stocks owned by
the foreigners (or 6% of the total U.S. stock market value) is owned by foreign nancial institutions.
Table 4: Country-by-Country Regressions
Sweden United United Germany Finland Japan France Canada
Kingdom States
Constant 0.33 {0.74 {0.09 1.16 0.87 {1.5 2.6 {1.71
(0.5) ({1.0) ({0.3) (0.8) (0.7) ({2.3)
 (0.9) ({0.9)
GAP5 {50.8 {41.6 {16.4 {134.5 {5.1 143.7 32.8 {11.2
({2.0)
 ({1.4) ({0.4) ({1.5) ({0.2) (1.1) (0.1) ({0.2)
SMOOTH5 1.9 32.7 {22.8 {9.5 {69.7 {33.0 {121.8 65.7
(0.1) (0.8) ({1.0) ({0.4) ({1.4) ({0.7) ({0.8) (1.0)
R
2 0.462 0.092 0.045 0.056 0.021 0.055 0.027 0.052
#Observations 56 47 65 55 46 54 28 45
The table reports the regression results by country. The dependent variable is the households' annual percentage
ownership change and the independent variables are proxy variables for the tax benets of saving inside a retirement
account. The proxy variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the income ve times GDP per




 denote signicance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better, respectively, against the null hypothesis
that the coecient is zero.
When we estimate the regression within each country, the GAP5 variable has explanatory
power only in Sweden, where high eective taxation of dividends and capital gains in the 1970s and
1980s coincides with the migration of shares from the household sector to nancial institutions and
corporations. There is no statistically signicant relation in the United States, because the rate of
change in the fraction of household ownership is fast and steady both before and after TRA 1986,
when eective taxation of stock income decreases signicantly.
5.2 Robustness tests
In constructing benchmark proxies for tax rate variables, SMOOTH and GAP, we inevitably have
to make a number of ad hoc assumptions. In this section, we submit our empirical results to a
number of stress tests to explore their robustness. The overall conclusion is that our results are
robust to a number of important variations in parameter assumptions as well as in econometric
methodology.
395.2.1 Parameters
We start by re-considering the main economic result from the panel regression (9) that the GAP5
variable predicts changes in the fraction of household ownership. The construction of GAP5 depends
on several parameter choices. Specically, we assumed a particular GDP income multiple of ve,
we assumed the capital gains tax deferral parameter value of 0.50, the constant dividend yield of
4%, and the dividend growth rate of 2%. Figure 8 examines how the regression coecient of GAP
changes when we vary any of these four parameters. In each plot, the regression coecient of









































The four gures report the estimated regression coecient of GAP5 (diamonds) and a 95% condence
interval (solid lines) as we vary the income multiple (a), capital gains tax deferral parameter (b), the
dividend yield (c), and the dividend growth rate (d). The regressions are estimated as in Table 2.
GAP is marked by a diamond with a 95% condence interval represented by the solid lines above
40and below. We vary the income multiple from GDP1 to GDP15 (Panel (a)), the capital gains tax
deferral parameter from 0% (no capital gains tax) to 100% (full statutory rate) (Panel (b)), the
dividend yield from 0% to 6% (Panel (c)), and the dividend growth rate from 0% to 4% (Panel (d)).
Across all four comparative statics experiments, the regression coecient is almost invariant to
parameter changes and the upper boundary of the condence interval is well below zero. In these
experiments only one variable varies at a time. However, experiments where we vary more than one
parameter simultaneously, e.g. the dividend yield and the dividend growth rate, do not have much
impact on the GAP5 regression coecient either. Hence, we conclude that the regression results
are robust to the choice of specic parameters. While not reported in the plots, the regression
coecients of SMOOTH remain statistically insignicant across the various experiments.34
Table 5: Time-Varying Parameters
Constant Moving dividend & Constant dividend & Moving
parameters constant growth moving growth parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant {0.20 {0.23 {0.25 {0.26
({0.8) ({0.9) ({1.0) ({1.0)






SMOOTH5 0.8 {0.7 {0.6 {1.7
(0.1) ({0.1) ({0.1) ({0.2)
R
2 0.034 0.042 0.039 0.038
#Observations 396 396 396 396
The table reports the regression results with time-varying dividend yield and income growth. Specication (1)
is our base case with dividend yield d = 4%, real income growth g = 2%, and three-year moving average
ination. The other three specications measure either dividend yield or nominal income growth as three-year
moving averages. For dividends, we create one aggregate dividend yield time-series from an equally weighted
average across all countries and compute the three-year moving average dividend yield. For income growth,
we average nominal GDP-per-capita time-series across countries and compute the three-year moving average
nominal GDP-per-capita growth. The dependent variable is the households' annual percentage ownership
change and the independent variables are proxy variables for the tax benets of saving inside a retirement
account. The proxy variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the income ve times




 denote signicance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better, respectively,
against the null hypothesis that the coecient is zero.
In our benchmark case, we assume that dividend yield and income growth are constants. This
is a simplication as both the actual time-series appear to be non-stationary over the time period
34The unreported results on GAP and SMOOTH are available from the authors upon request.
41we study. Both dividend yields and real growth rates decrease over time. In Table 5, we examine
the robustness of our regression results to relaxing the assumption of constant parameters. Spec-
ication (1) is our base case. The other three specications vary either the dividend yield, the
growth rate, or both as three-year moving averages. We see across the columns in the table that
the regression results are similar and not dependent on our choice of constant or time-varying pa-
rameters. The reported results are based on aggregating dividend yield and GDP-per-capita time
series across countries and use the same parameter for all countries at each point of time. The
results are similar when we allow the dividend yield and GDP-per-capita time-series to be country
specic.
5.2.2 Limited Dependent Variable
The benchmark panel regression model we employ is linear. In our case, it has an uncomfortable
feature that it would predict that, after many years, the fraction of household ownership turns
negative if the coecient is below zero. A more realistic model would take into account that the
eect of taxation diminishes as the level of household ownership decreases, such that the predicted
level of household ownership converges to zero over long time. This limitation of the linear model is
addressed by the following regression model, which interacts the lagged level of household ownership
with the tax variables:
yit = y

it 1 (a + b  GAP5it + c  SMOOTH5it + eit): (11)
If the power coecient equals one,  = 1, the tax variables have full eect when the lagged level
of household ownership is yit 1 = 1, half eect when yit 1 = 0:5, and no eect when yit 1 = 0. If
we reduce the power coecient to  = 0:5, the tax variables have 70.7% eect when yit 1 = 0:5.
The extreme version of the non-linear regression model (11) is when the power coecient is  = 0,
which brings us back to the benchmark linear regression model (9). A small power coecient  > 0
implies that the regression model is almost linear at high and intermediate levels of household
ownership, and highly non-linear when household ownership approaches zero.
Table (6) reports the results of the non-linear model estimation. In the rst column we show
42Table 6: Non-Linear Regression Model
Least squares
Max likelihood  = 0  = 0:25  = 0:50  = 0:75  = 1:00
Constant {0.15 {0.20 {0.13 {0.19 {0.30 {0.41














t 1SMOOTH5 {3.7 0.8 {4.9 {8.8 {9.5 {8.5




2 0.034 0.032 0.026 0.020 0.014
#Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396
The table reports the regression results by country. The dependent variable is the households' annual percentage
ownership change and the independent variables are proxy variables for the tax benets of saving inside a retirement
account. The proxy variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the income ve times GDP per




 denote signicance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better, respectively, against the null hypothesis
that the coecient is zero.
the maximum likelihood results, and in other columns the least squares results when the value of
the power coecient is superimposed. The second column ( = 0) is the benchmark case. The
maximum likelihood estimate is  = 0:053 with a t-statistic of 0.2. These estimates mean that the
linear regression model (9) describes the data well as long as the level of household ownership is not
close to zero. When we superimpose and raise the power coecient , the explanatory power of the
regression model decreases. A possible explanation why the lagged level of household ownership
does not raise the overall explanatory power is that household ownership continues to decrease
rapidly in the 1990s when foreign investors enter stock markets. Therefore, for spurious reasons,
we do not see the decreasing eect of the tax variables as household ownership approaches zero.
5.2.3 Missing Data
The nal Table 7 investigates the eect of how we deal with missing data. The base case results
using random imputation are compared with the methods of multiple imputation and listwise
deletion. Multiple imputation means that the regression coecients from the complete portion of
43Table 7: Data Selection Model
Random imputation Multiple imputation Listwise deletion
(1) (2) (3)
Constant {0.20 {0.18 {0.20
({0.8) ({0.6) ({0.7)









#Observations 396 396 305
The table reports the regression results under three dierent methods to handle missing values. Random imputation
is our base case where we interpolate missing values and add white noise. Multiple imputation uses the regression
parameters from the complete portion of the sample to impute the missing values. Listwise deletion uses only the
complete portion of the data. The dependent variable is the households' annual percentage ownership change and
the independent variables are proxy variables for the tax benets of saving inside a retirement account. The proxy
variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the income ve times GDP per capita. The
regressions are estimated as in Table 2. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coecients. Asterisk
,
, and
 denote signicance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better, respectively, against the null hypothesis that the
coecient is zero.
the data are used to ll in the missing values. The explanatory power of this data selection model is
less than that of our base case because the information embedded in the scattered ownership data
points from the early years in Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom is not used. Therefore,
multiple imputation is not better than listwise deletion, which simply deletes the missing data.
However, it is reassuring that our main regression results are also robust to the most conservative
treatment of missing data.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided evidence that government policies enacted generations ago may
have unintended long-term consequences. The response to the higher eective income taxation,
implemented in the developed world in search of higher tax revenues since World War II, has been
the precipitous decline in taxable direct household ownership transferred into various tax-deferred
plans. This behavior partially reversed higher tax revenue goals and was an impulse for the devel-
opment of the nancial intermediary industry as we know it today. Our results bear signicantly on
44several avenues of academic research (income taxation, corporate governance, nancial institutions,
asset pricing, to name a few) and public policy debates.
Our results and conjectures need to be seen in perspective to the tidal waive of inuential
academic research that argued that need for diversication and lowering transaction costs can
explain stylized facts associated with nancial institutions and asset ownership. Future research to
compare and reconcile these arguments is certainly imperative, as the scope of our work has not
allowed us to study in any meaningful way a number of alternative explanations. As an example, in
a sequence of works, Allen and Gale (1994), Allen and Santomero (1998), and Allen and Gale (2000)
argue that professional asset managers can use complex and sophisticated nancial instruments to
improve risk sharing beyond that of simple diversication and that risk sharing may be a leading
force in observed changes in institutional and ownership structures. A problem for arguments
based on risk sharing is to explain why mutual funds that specialize in risk sharing are small
before they become part of the retirement system. Another challenge is to explain why the stock
ownership structures of high-tax countries and low-tax countries follow dierent paths during the
high-ination period of the 1960s{80s. But a more fundamental empirical analysis of this as well
as other conjectures is still to be attempted.
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49A Appendix: Aggregate Stock and Bond Ownership Data
In this Appendix, we report additional data sources and variable denitions used in Section 2.1.
Aggregate stock market ownership data for the United States is reported in the Flow of Funds, Table
L.213. Aggregate bond ownership is spread out over four tables. To calculate bond ownership, we
combine bond holdings from tables L.209 (Treasury Securities), L.210 (Agency- and GSE-Backed
Securities), and L.212 (Corporate and Foreign Bonds). We exclude municipal bonds (Table L.211),
and we subtract \Savings bonds" from Table L.209. We then combine a number of series within each
table to calculate our specic ownership categories. Mutual Funds combines \Money market mutual
funds" and \Mutual funds" from Tables L.209, L.210, and L.212 as well as \Closed-end funds"
and \Exchange-traded funds" from Tables L.209 and L.212. Pension Funds combines \Private
pension funds," \State and local govt. retirement funds," and \Federal government retirement
funds". Insurance is composed of of \Life insurance companies", but we exclude \Property-casualty
insurance companies".















The gure reports the percent of U.S. pension fund assets that are invested in mutual funds. Data
source: Flow of Funds.
The aggregate balance sheet of pension funds can be constructed from combining Tables L.118
(Private Pension Funds), L.119 (State and Local Government Employee Retirement Funds), and
50L.120 (Federal Government Retirement Funds). Stocks are identied as \Corporate equities", and
xed income securities as \Credit market instruments", \Checkable deposits and currency," \Time
and savings deposits,", and \Money market fund shares". Pension funds also hold mutual fund
shares and miscellaneous other assets. The evolution of the pension fund holdings of mutual fund
shares can be sees in Figure A1. A growing share of pension fund asset management is outsourced
to the mutual fund industry.
B Appendix: Personal Taxation of Stocks
This appendix explains the principles of personal taxation of income from stocks in the United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, and Finland. We do not cover
the taxation of corporate income except where it is needed to understand personal taxation of
dividends. The following general notation is used:
d = personal tax rate on dividend income.
r = reduction rate on dividend income.
i = imputation rate on dividend income.
g = personal tax rate on capital gains.
p = personal tax rate on ordinary income.
pi = personal tax rate on investment income.
pc = central personal tax rate.
ps = sub-central personal tax rate.
sc = central surtax rate on personal tax.
ss = sub-central surtax rate on personal tax.
The precise meaning of each tax rate is explained in its context below. Many tax systems are
covered and additional notation is introduced as needed. The statutory tax rate data are not
reported here, but can be requested from the authors.
51B.1 United States
Personal income is subject to federal, state, and city taxes. When there is a choice (since 1949), we
choose the federal tax tables for a married couple ling jointly. We adjust for state tax by assuming
it is a time-series constant ps = 5%, but we ignore city tax. The assumption for the state tax rate
is based on the equally-weighted average top statutory state tax rates in 1950, 1987, and 2006. The
information is taken from Sagoo (2005).
B.1.1 Dividends
From 1913{2002, dividends are taxed as ordinary income. State taxes are deductible at the federal
level, so the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals:
d = pc(1   ps) + ps; (B1)
where pc is the federal tax rate and ps the state tax rate. In 2003, the United States switches to a
dual-income system, where ordinary income and investment income are taxed as separate income
classes. The marginal tax rate on dividends is:
d = pi(1   ps) + ps; (B2)
where pi is the dividend tax rate.
B.1.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1916. From 1916{1933, realized capital gains on stocks
are taxed as ordinary income. From 1922{1933, the capital gains tax rate is capped at 12.5%. From
1934{1986, a portion  of long-term capital gains is taxed:
g =   [pc(1   ps) + ps]: (B3)
52The inclusion portion  varies over time. The federal capital gains tax rate is capped at 30%
(1938{1941) and 25% (1942{1969). The cap is removed in 1972{1986. There is a Vietnam war
capital gains surtax sg in 1968{1970:
g =   [pc(1 + sg)(1   ps) + ps]: (B4)
Since 1987, long-term capital gains are taxed as a separate income class:
g = pi(1   ps) + ps; (B5)
where pi is the long-term capital gains tax rate.
B.2 Canada
A distinguishing feature of the Canadian tax system is that provincial (sub-central) tax rates are
dened as proportions of federal (central) taxes. Hence, central and sub-central tax rates are
multiplied with each other, which means that the provincial tax is a tax on the federal tax. We
approximate the provincial tax with the rates from Ontario. Our main data sources are Revenue
Canada (1950{2006), Perry (1989), and Perry (1990).35
B.2.1 Dividends
We begin with the Canadian tax system in 1949{1971. A tax credit is provided at the central level
for sub-central taxes. Let rs denote the sub-central reduction rate. The personal tax rate net of
the sub-central tax credit equals:
p = pc + (ps   rs)pc: (B6)
35We would like to thank particularly Alan Macnaughton of the University of Waterloo for carefully checking the
details of our analysis of the Canadian tax code.
53Dividends are taxed as personal income, but Canada oers a dividend-tax relief at rate r. Dividend
income is taxed at the rate:
d = pc   r (central tax)
+ (ps   rs)  (pc   r) (sub-central tax)
(B7)
This expression corrects Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Booth and Johnston (1984), who
include the sub-central tax credit, but fail to include the sub-central tax.
We proceed with the tax system in 1972{1999. There are two important changes. First, an
imputation-tax credit at rate i replaces the dividend-reduction rate r. The dividend tax and the
imputation-tax credit are levied on the grossed-up dividend 1 + g. Second, the sub-central tax
credit is abandoned and, later, surtaxes are added at both the central and the sub-central level.
The surtaxes are dened as proportions of other taxes. Dividend income is taxed at rate:
d = [(1 + g)pc   (1 + g)i] (central tax)
+ [(1 + g)pc   (1 + g)i]  sc (central surtax)
+ [(1 + g)pc   (1 + g)i]  ps (sub-central tax)
+ [(1 + g)pc   (1 + g)i]  ps  ss (sub-central surtax)
(B8)
This expression can be simplied to:
d = (1 + g)(pc   i)[1 + ps(1 + ss) + sc]: (B9)
The personal tax rate is simpler as there is no imputation-tax credit:
p = pc [1 + ps(1 + ss) + sc]: (B10)
Next, we explain the Canadian tax system as of 2000{2005. This tax reform changes the sub-
central tax. Instead of a tax on tax, the sub-central tax becomes a tax on income. Surtaxes remain
54to be tax on tax. A new sub-central dividend credit at rate rs is also introduced:
d = [(1 + g)pc   (1 + g)i] (central tax)
+ [(1 + g)pc   (1 + g)i]  sc (central surtax)
+ [(1 + g)ps   (1 + g)rs] (sub-central tax)
+ [(1 + g)ps   (1 + g)rs]  ss (sub-central surtax)
(B11)
Essentially, the federal and provincial taxes are calculated separately and then summed together.
The expression simplies to:
d = (1 + g)[(pc   i)(1 + sc) + (ps   rs)(1 + ss)]: (B12)
Again, the personal tax rate is simpler:
p = pc(1 + sc) + ps(1 + ss): (B13)
B.2.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1972. The principles have not changed as of 2006. A
proportion of long-term capital gains  is taxed as ordinary income:
g =   p: (B14)
From 1986{1989, households earn a lifetime capital gains exemption for the sale of all property
including real estate. Although the exemption amount is quite large, we ignore this provision.
B.3 United Kingdom
Income taxes are collected at the central level only, so we do not need to worry about sub-central
taxes. The main information and data sources are Orhnial and Foldes (1975), King (1977), and
the HM Revenue & Customs website (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/index.htm).
55B.3.1 Dividends
From 1947{1964, the United Kingdom has a tax system which can be characterized as a hybrid
of two business taxation models. One component conforms to the classical model of corporate
taxation with double taxation except that there are dierent tax rates for distributed and retained
prots. Specically, the corporation pays corporate tax at rate cd on distributed prots and rate
cr on retained prots, where cd  cr. Shareholders in higher income brackets pay personal tax on
dividends at rate p   pst, where pst is the standard rate of income tax. The other component of
the hybrid system conforms to the standard model of partnership taxation, where business income
passes through and is taxed as personal income. Specically, shareholders pay tax on corporate
income at the standard rate of income tax pst irrespective of whether corporate income is paid out
or retained. This tax is paid in addition to personal tax on dividends.
In the hybrid system, the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals the personal rate. To
see this, we decompose pre-tax corporate income Y into after-tax dividend D, after-tax retained
earnings RET, paid corporate taxes on dividends, and paid corporate taxes on retained earnings:
Y = D + cdD + RET + crRET: (B15)
From 1947{1951, an individual shareholder is liable for personal tax in the amount:
(p   pst)D + pstD + pstRET: (B16)
The rst term is personal income tax on dividends (rst component of the hybrid system). The
second and the third terms are personal tax on corporate income (second component). From this
expression, we can see that the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals:
d = (p   pst) + pst = p: (B17)
From 1952{1964, the corporate tax deductability is removed and shareholders are also liable for
56personal tax on paid corporate taxes:
(p   pst)D + pstD + pstRET + pst(cdD + crRET): (B18)
We can see that the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals the marginal tax rate on personal
income as in (B17).
In 1965{1972, the United Kingdom switches to a classical tax system. Dividends are taxed as
personal income at rate d = p. A few years later, in 1973{1998, the United Kingdom switches to
an imputation-tax system with a signicant dividend-tax relief. The tax and the imputation-tax






The imputation rate is dened as the standard rate of income tax, which means that only households
in higher income brackets pay tax on dividends. From 1973{1984, dividend income above an
exclusion amount is subject to investment income surcharge at rate 15% on top of the ordinary
income tax rate for high-income earners. We ignore the surcharge in our calculations because the
exclusion amount is large.
Since 1999, the United Kingdom combines the imputation-tax system with a dual-income system






Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1965. From 1965{1987, the United Kingdom practices a
dual-income system where realized capital gains are subject to a proportional rate after an initial
exempt amount. From 1988{2006, realized capital gains are taxed as ordinary income except for an
initial exempt amount. From 1982{1997, the cost basis is indexed for ination with values provided
in a table. The gap plot for the United Kingdom in Figure 6a is corrected for indexing.
57B.3.3 Pensions
From 1973{1997, untaxed investors also earn a tax refund on dividends (see Bell and Jenkinson








d + g; (B21)










Taxes are collected at the central level, but the revenues from specic taxes are reserved for the
sub-central administration. The central tax is referred to as national tax and the sub-central taxes
as prefectural tax and municipal tax, respectively. From 1953{1961, municipalities are oered the
choice among three dierent tax schedules. We focus on option b which becomes the standard from
1962. The main data sources are Ishi (2001) and Tax Bureau of Finance (1953{2005). We are
missing the tax tables from 1949{1952.36
B.4.1 Dividends
Dividend income is taxed as personal income subject to central tax rate pc and sub-central tax
rate ps (prefectural and municipal tax). Both the central and the sub-central tax schedules are
progressive. From 1950{2006, Japan oers a dividend-tax credit in the form of a rate reduction.
The central reduction rate is rc and the sub-central reduction rate rs. The marginal tax rate on
dividend income equals:
d = pc + ps   rc   rs: (B23)
The reduction rates are lower for higher dividend income (two income brackets). In our calculations,
we choose the reduction rate for the lower income level because the higher income tax bracket is
36We would like to thank particularly Chihiro Shima of the Development Bank of Japan for help with understanding
the Japanese tax code.
58high (annual dividend income above JPY 10 million, approximately USD 100,000). The marginal
tax rates on personal income pc + ps is capped from 1961{1988:
d = min[pc + ps;cap]   rc   rs; (B24)
i.e., the dividend-tax reduction is earned in full after the cap is imposed.
From 1965{2006, the marginal tax rate on dividends depends on the dividend amount earned
from each stock in the portfolio. Therefore, the marginal tax rate does not only depend on household
income but also on portfolio composition and dividend yield. The dividend is small, intermediate, or
large depending on whether the dividend on the stock falls below, between, or exceeds JPY 50,000
and 250,000, respectively. In 1973, the cutos are doubled. From 1965{1988, large dividends are
taxed according to (B23). This tax treatment referred to as Case I in Figure 5a and the text above.
For intermediate dividends, the shareholder can choose between personal taxation (B23) and the
following simplied procedure:
d = pi + ps   rs: (B25)
Under the option, a proportional investment tax pi replaces the central tax schedule pc and reduc-
tion rc. The option is referred to as Case II above. Finally, for small dividends, the shareholder can
choose between personal taxation (B23) and not reporting the dividend income on the tax return.
In the latter case, the shareholder ends up paying the proportional withholding tax collected at
source. This is referred to as Case III above.
B.4.2 Capital Gains
Before 1953, capital gains on stocks are taxed as ordinary income. From 1953{1988, stocks are
exempt from capital gains tax. Capital gains tax on stocks is reintroduced in 1989. For long-term
capital gains dened by the minimum holding period of one year, shareholders are given a choice.
First, the investor can choose to not report the capital gain. In this case, the capital gains tax
equals the withholding tax of 1% of the sales price. Second, if the investor chooses to report the
capital gain on the tax return, it is subject to a proportional investment income tax (national tax
59and local inhabitants tax). We ignore capital gains tax in our calculations.
B.5 Germany
Personal income is taxed at the central level only. We choose the tax schedule for a married
couple ling jointly. From 1958{2006, there is only one tax schedule. Then, the tax for a married
couple equals two times the tax on half the income, so the marginal tax rate for a married couple
with income equal to GDP5 equals the marginal tax rate of a single ler with income equal to
GDP2.5. The main data sources are B orsch-Supan (1994), Corneo (2005), and the German Tax
Administration. We use the 1954 tax table for 1955 and 1956, which are missing.37
B.5.1 Dividends
Dividends are taxed as personal income. A special feature of the German tax code since 1958 is
that the tax liability function is determined by a step function in the lowest and highest income
brackets and a polynomial in the intermediate income brackets which, for married ling jointly,
generalizes to:























where Y denotes taxable income and fa;b1;b2;b3;c;dg are parameters which vary over time. Taking






















The polynomial function has three terms in 1958{1974, four terms in 1975{1989 (as shown), and
two terms in 1990{2006 (linear function).
From 1977{2001, Germany has an imputation-tax system that works as in the United King-
dom, Equation (B19). From 2002{2006, Germany switches to a partial-inclusion system, where a
37We would like to thank particularly Sebastian Herzog of the University of Mannheim for help with understanding
the German tax code.
60proportion  of the dividend is taxable income:
d =   p: (B28)










(1 + sc) , in 1990{2001;
p(1 + sc) , in 2002{2006:
(B29)
From 1950{2006, there is also a church tax which also enters like a multiplicative surtax. We
ignore this tax. The church tax is optional (one can opt out of the church), the eective tax rate
is relatively small in the order of 1{2%, and it varies geographically.
B.5.2 Capital Gains
Long-term capital gains dened by a minimum holding period of six months before 1998 and 12
months from 1998 are exempt from capital gains tax.
B.6 France
Taxes are collected at the central level only. We ignore surtaxes in our calculations. The main data
sources are Foug ere (1994) and Piketty (2001).
B.6.1 Dividends
From 1950-1959, dividends are taxed at source at rate w. The net dividend is taxed as personal
income:
d = 1   (1   p)(1   w): (B30)
From 1960-1964, dividends are taxed as personal income. The withholding tax is fully deductible:
d = p: (B31)
61From 1965-2004, France has a standard imputation-tax system that oers a partial credit for
corporate taxes on distributed prots as in (B19). In 2005-2006, France replaces the imputation-
tax system with a partial-inclusion system where a proportion  of the dividend is taxed as personal
income as in (B28).
B.6.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1976. Capital gains are taxed as a separate income class
subject to a low proportional rate. A relatively large amount is exempt, so we assume that the
capital gains tax is eectively zero.
B.7 Sweden
Personal income is subject to national tax (central), municipal tax, and church tax (sub-central).
We use the average municipal tax rate, but we ignore the prefectural tax and the church tax, which
are relatively small. We also ignore a social security tax (Folkpensionsavgift, 1936-1973), which
is based on ordinary income including investment income. The social security tax is capped and
rather small at higher income levels. When there is a choice (1953{1970), we use the national tax
rates for a married couple ling jointly. The main data sources are S oderberg (1996), Statistics
Sweden, and the Swedish Tax Administration.
B.7.1 Dividends






pc(1   ps) + ps , in 1948{1970;
pc + ps , in 1971{1990:
(B32)
The combined marginal tax rate is capped in 1980{1985. In 1991, Sweden introduces a dual-income
system, where ordinary income is subject to a progressive schedule and dividend income is taxed
as investment income subject to a lower proportional rate:
d = pi: (B33)
62B.7.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1910. From 1910{1951, short-term capital gains as dened
by a holding period of less than ve years are taxed as ordinary income, while long-term capital
gains are exempt. From 1952{1976, a portion  of short-term capital gains is taxed as ordinary
income as in (B14). The portion depends on the holding period:
 =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
100% , if 0{2 years;
75% , if 2{3 years;
50% , if 3{4 years;
25% , if 4{5 years;
0% , if >5 years:
(B34)
From 1967{1976, 10% of the sales price of a security held more than ve years is taxed as ordinary





100% , if 0{2 years;
40% , if >2 years:
(B35)
In 1990, the proportion increases to  = 50%. From 1991{2006, all capital gains are taxed as
investment income:
g = pi: (B36)
The tax rule in eect 1967{1976 removes the basis from the calculation of the long-term capital
gain. As above, let g denote nominal stock price growth rate. The statutory marginal tax rate on




(1 + g)N   1
!
: (B37)
This expression shows that the eect on the marginal tax rate from the loss of the basis is small
over long investment horizons, especially when expected stock price growth is high. The value of
63the basis protection disappears in the limit as N goes to innity. In the analysis above, we assume
that N = 15, g = 2% + i, where i equals three-year moving average ination.
B.7.3 Pensions
From 1991{2006, imputed income from pension asset management dened as the average treasury
rate during the previous year times the value of the pension assets in the beginning of the year is
taxed at the proportional rate 15%. We denote rf as the expected treasury rate with and measure
it as 1% plus moving average ination. Equation (5) becomes:
GAP =




Income taxation in Finland resembles Sweden in many ways. Personal income is subject to national
tax (central), municipal tax, and church tax (sub-central). We approximate the sub-central tax
rate with the average municipal tax rate, but we ignore the relatively small church tax. We use the
national tax tables for a married couple ling jointly with no dependents (1950{1975). The main
data sources are Kukkonen (2000) and the Finnish Tax Administration.
B.8.1 Dividends
From 1950{1992, dividends are taxed as ordinary income. The marginal tax rate on dividends
equals the sum of central and sub-central tax rates:
d = pc + ps: (B39)
From 1993{2004, Finland uses a dual-income system with full imputation. Dividends are subject to
investment income tax at rate pi and corporate tax is credited back through imputation as in the
United Kingdom, Equation (B19). Most years, the investment income rate equals the imputation
rate so that d = 0. Recently, in 2005{2006, Finland replaces the imputation system with a partial-
64inclusion system such that a proportion  of the dividend is taxed as investment income:
d =   pi: (B40)
B.8.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1920. From 1920{1985, short-term capital gains as dened
by a holding period of less than ve years are taxed as ordinary income, while long-term capital
gains are exempt. From 1986{1992, the rules change gradually towards the new system in place
since 1993. An initial (large) amount is tax exempt. A portion  of the capital gain above the
tax-exempt amount is taxed as ordinary income as in (B14). The portion depends on the holding





100% , if 0{5 years;
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> > > > > :
100% , if 0{4 years;
80% , if 4{5 years;





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
100% , if 0{4 years;
80% , if 4{5 years;
50% , if >5 years:
(B43)
From 1993{2006, all capital gains on stocks are taxed as investment income as in (B36). Since
1986, a long-term investor has the option to dene the capital gain as 50% of the sales price from
1986{1992 and 30% from 1993{2006. In our calculations, we ignore this option and the initial
tax-exempt amount because the dierence is small.
65